They then weigh perceived benefits against perceived costs when making their voting decision. This article employs data gathered in a national panel survey conducted just before and immediately after the June 23rd referendum to investigate the forces that shaped the choices voters made in the referendum. Given the Remain campaign’s highly negative tone, Boris Johnson and other leading Leave advocates accused Remainers of blatant scaremongering and relabelled the campaign to stay as ‘Project Fear’.2 The label was uncomfortably close to the mark. They evaluate European integration in terms of their communal identities and their views towards foreigners and foreign cultures. Leader image cues provided by Farage and Johnson were influential too. If lawmakers don't take their final chance to vote for British Prime Minister Theresa May's Brexit deal on Tuesday, then -- in the words of European Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker -- … Welsh identifiers were an intermediate case; they were no different from British identifiers regarding economic-influence benefit-cost evaluations, but were significantly more likely to have immigration-terrorism evaluations that would help to prompt a Leave vote. These possibilities are tested by including measures of voters’ partisan attachments in the analyses. As extremely high profile figures on opposite sides of the referendum question, Cameron and Johnson were heavily covered by media throughout the campaign.6 This gave them ample opportunity to cue the public about how to vote on June 23rd. China to tighten grip on Hong Kong elections, 'Liberating' to be able to speak - Meghan, Tiger Woods: Car crashes and comebacks. Theoretical Perspectives on Brexit Voting, Receive exclusive offers and updates from Oxford Academic. Next, we model the effects of various predictors on perceptions of risk, the third most important predictor of voting in the referendum. An Analysis of the EU-Referendum Vote This Week. For information about question wording and variable construction see the Measurement Appendix in Supplementary Material. Over 93 per cent of voters are correctly classified by the analysis—this represents an 86.2 per cent reduction in prediction error. Note also that the composite model that specifies all of the predictor variables (Table 1 above) has better fit statistics (R2 = 0.90, AIC = 658.02) than any of its sub-models. During the campaign numerous polls showed large differences in support for/opposition to EU membership across age groups, with older people indicating that they were more likely to endorse Brexit than were younger people. The figure displays McKelvey R2 and AIC values for several logit models of the vote that use different specifications of predictors.9 As shown, the benefit-costs model dominates its competitors, with the largest R2 (0.85) and the smallest AIC (748.35).10 Other relatively powerful models include the risk assessment model (R2 = 0.73), the emotional reactions to the EU model (R2 = 0.71) and the leader cues model (R2 = 0.71). Only days before the vote pro-Remain Chancellor George Osborne claimed that Brexit would produce a £30 billion ‘black hole’ in the budget that would necessitate harsh public spending cuts and tax increases. A 95% confidence interval (standard error = 1.2 per cent) for the vote shares reported in the survey easily covers the actual vote percentages for Remain and Leave. The chain of events that led to Brexit will be examined in great detail — and much anguish on the Remain side — for years to come. If risk assessments influenced referendum voting, the expectation is that the more risk people perceived the less likely they would be to prefer Brexit. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Hansard Society; all rights reserved. Leader images were another story. A plurality of our survey respondents agreed—37 per cent believed that EU membership helped to keep the peace in Europe while 29 per cent thought the opposite. Although many polls differed in terms of their estimated share of the vote for leave and remain they did tell a consistent story about which groups had voted leave. Nearly a quarter (24%) decided in the week before referendum day; and one in ten decided yesterday, or on the day they filled in their postal vote. They won almost three quarters of all these seats. During the referendum campaign, the Remain side deployed a expansive ‘Davos A List’ of world leaders, senior civil servants, business moguls and celebrities to try and convince voters of the negative economic consequences that would ensue if the UK were to leave the EU. OLS regression analysis of predictors of perceived risks of leaving the EU. For the first time, both the Liberal Democrats and Labour have more women MPs than men. Figures 2 and 3 display responses to survey questions about the perceived costs and benefits of leaving or remaining in the EU. When all votes were counted 51.9 percent of those voting had opted to leave providing a lead over the Remain vote that extended to almost 7 percentage points in England. Overall, as the two bars on the far right of Figure 3 indicate, 32 per cent chose one or more positive words, while 50 per cent chose one or more negative words. In every nation and region of Britain, the scale of Labour's losses outweighed any gains made by the Conservatives. Taken together, the issues stressed by the Leave and Remain campaigns point to the importance of cost-benefit calculations and attendant risk assessments, feelings of attachment to a wider community and cues from political elites in shaping the outcome of the 2016 referendum—three types of explanation that have received significant attention in studies of the drivers of public attitudes to the EU. Video, Celebrating the world's largest female afro. Introduction On June 24, 2016, the citizens of the United Kingdom voted in favor for their departure from the European Union. Analysis by Jane Merrick, for CNN. Strong Leave and strong Remain constituencies are those where an estimated 60% or more of the electorate voted for that option at the EU referendum. Steenbergen et al., 2007; Ray, 2003), the effects of media coverage of the EU on support for integration (Vliegenthart et al., 2008), the influence of national identities in shaping public attitudes (Carey, 2002), and the role of the economy in influencing support for further integration (Gabel and Whitten, 1997). VideoTiger Woods: Car crashes and comebacks, Stunning images from Nasa's Perseverance rover, How a nine-year-old fought an oil company and won, The women using art to explain Covid-19 science. The survey was conducted via internet by YouGov, plc., with funding provided by the ESRC’s ‘The UK in a Changing Europe’ programme. Two highly significant predictors (p < 0.001) in this model are negative attitudes towards immigration and perceptions that Britain no longer controls its own economy. When asked a second question on the topic, the difference was larger—47 per cent agreed that there would be more terrorism if the country remained in the EU and 28 per cent disagreed (see Figure 3). Although the mean score (5.6) was very close to the scale’s mid-point (5), opinion was tilted towards the ‘risky’ end, with a majority (54 per cent) assigning scores of six of greater. Johnson was widely seen as an unofficial leader of the Leave campaign. However, evidence on the effects of identity is mixed, with positive relationships existing between Scottish and Welsh identities and support for European integration (Haesly, 2001). Emotional reactions to membership also exerted substantial effects, with a shift from the 10 per cent (negative) to the 90 per cent (positive) rank on the EU emotions scale reducing the probability of a Brexit ballot by 0.48 points. This pattern (‘LeDuc’s law’) is consistent with research in experimental economics and cognitive psychology that emphasizes the importance of risk orientations when individuals are making choices in contexts of high stakes and abundant uncertainty (Gigerenzer, 2008; Kahneman, 2011). Analysis in of the 2019 general election in maps and charts. Considering calculations first, this is commonly viewed as a ‘soft’ rational choice exercise in which voters evaluate the benefits of EU membership, often focusing on the economy and their own personal circumstances. Other studies also have produced evidence which suggests that individual economic cost-benefit analyses have become increasingly important for explaining public reactions to the EU since the 2008 financial meltdown and ensuing Eurozone crisis (Hobolt and Wratil 2015; see also Hobolt and deVries, 2016). But Labour lost votes in both strong Remain and strong Leave areas. These studies explore a range of factors, including the influence of parties and elites on public opinion (e.g. The panel design is well-suited for studying how various factors affected voting in the referendum. Since the binomial logit model of referendum voting has a nonlinear functional form, interpretation of the strength of predictor variables is not straightforward (Long and Freese, 2014). It seems logical, therefore, to suggest that decades of inequality and electoral mistrust has culminated in such a cataclysmic event. Corbyn’s desultory campaign efforts, together with the much publicised Conservative divisions over the EU, eroded the strength of cueing effects of the Labour Party and its leader. Analysis by Daniel Dunford, Wesley Stephenson, Irene de la Torre Arenas, Becky Dale, Chris Jeavans, Will Dahlgreen, Maryam Ahmed, Ed Lowther, Sumit Rahman, Robert Cuffe, John Walton, Pope lands in Iraq amid virus and security risks. Accordingly, if identities are influential, their effects likely will be antecedents in the causal chain of forces affecting referendum voting, rather than having an immediate effect on the voting decision. To Brexit or Not. Equally, perceptions of the economic consequences of EU membership as well as cues provided by politicians whose popularity is volatile are also potential candidates for influencing attitudes towards EU membership. Just over a week before the vote, Chancellor George Osborne weighed in by raising the spectre of tax increases and benefit cuts should the electorate be so foolish as to opt for Brexit. The 2016 referendum was the second such event to ask UK citizens about their preferred relationship with Europe. In addition, three other predictor variables were specified. European Union Politics, Economic Conditions, Economic Perceptions, and Public Support for European Integration, Rationality for Mortals: How People Cope With Uncertainty, Heuristics: The Foundations of Adaptive Behavior, The 2016 Referendum, Brexit and Left Behind, UKIP: Inside the Campaign to Redraw the Map of British Politics, Euroskeptics, Europhiles and Instrumental Europeans: European Attachment in Scotland and Wales, Euroscepticism and Education: A Longitudinal Study of Twelve EU Member States, 1973-2010, The Brexit Vote: A Divided Nation, A Divided Continent, Public Opinion and the Crisis: The Dynamics of Support for the Euro. As the figure illustrates, risk perceptions were widely dispersed. The Conservatives did lose votes in the south of England and Scotland, but these were balanced by gains in the rest of England and Wales. VideoCelebrating the world's largest female afro, Why Olivia Colman's new film will leave you disorientated, 'Liberating' to be able to speak - Meghan1, 'Hovering ship' photographed off Cornish coast2, Silverman apologises to Hilton for prison jokes3, Judge dismisses suit over 'slave ancestor' photos4, Pope in Iraq: End violence and extremism5, World's 'oldest wild bird' has chick at age of 706, ‘Stop whining’ over Covid, Brazil’s president says7, Why Olivia Colman's new film will leave you disorientated8, UN 'yet to see proof' Princess Latifa is alive9, How a nine-year-old fought an oil company and won10. In contrast, both Labour and the Conservatives were divided on the referendum question—the latter much more so than the former. Given the strength of these forces demonstrated in the analyses presented above and the narrow division of the vote, it is plausible that a substantial change in any of them could have changed the referendum outcome. The models were analysed using data gathered in a national panel survey of the British electorate conducted just before and shortly after the referendum. As with the aggregate analy… Both models in Table 2 have quite strong explanatory power, with R2 values of 0.69 and 0.75, respectively. The backbench chairman of Conservative MPs, Graham Brady, was among the rebels — a sure... Former Remainers. Four of the words described positive emotional reactions and four described negative reactions. In Britain, one of the striking features of public attitudes towards membership of the EU is how volatile these attitudes can be (Whiteley et al., 2013; Clarke et al., 2016). In 2017, Labour held 72 of the 100 constituencies with the most working class households (defined as C2DE using data from the 2011 census). By contrast they lost votes in strong Remain constituencies such as those in Scotland and London. The hypothesis is that respondents will be more responsive to cues provided by leaders they like rather than those they dislike. In contrast, cues from the SNP, Liberal Democrats and UKIP were quite clear and so attachments to these parties might well have influenced the vote. It joined late, complained lots and on January 31st 2020 became the only country ever to leave. Search for other works by this author on: We begin by estimating the direct effects on referendum voting of the several predictor variables discussed above. These items are derived from a question asking respondents to describe their feelings about the country’s EU membership by selecting up to four words from a list of eight descriptors. Supplementary material available at Parliamentary Affairs online. Select the "results" tab to see what has happened in the rest of the UK. Both the economic-influence and immigration-terrorism benefit-cost factors played very significant roles in explaining the vote to leave. Other possible cues came from the political parties and also from the Remain and Leave campaigns. You can use the interactive map below to show the vote share for other parties as well as the turnout. Read about our approach to external linking. Of Labour's 202 MPs (excluding Speaker Lindsay Hoyle), 104 are women and of the Liberal Democrats' 11 MPs, seven are women. In an effort to understand who voted for Brexit, this paper offers a systematic analysis of the socio-economic characteristics that correlate with the outcome of the 2016 referendum and in particular with the cross-s… These estimates of constituency Brexit votes were modelled by Professor Chris Hanretty, as the 2016 referendum result was only recorded by local authority and not by Westminster constituency. Using OLS regression for this purpose, we see that the model fits the data very well, with the R2 indicating that 69 per cent of the variance in risk assessments is explained (Table 3). Analysis: Brexit is vote against the 'establishment' ITV News' National Editor Allegra Stratton has said Britain's decision to leave the European Union is a defiant vote "against …
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